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 NOTE 
Not Objecting to Prosecutor’s Offering of 
Fifth Amendment Protections from a Civil 
Deposition Is Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel 
Christian v. State, 502 S.W.3d 702 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) 
Anthony J. Meyer* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Supreme Court of Missouri Rules 24 and 29 provide the exclusive mech-
anism for post-conviction relief in Missouri.1  Rule 29.15 outlines the proce-
dure for relief following a felony conviction, and the standard it uses is the two-
prong test provided by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Wash-
ington.2  A person who has been convicted of a felony must file a motion under 
Rule 29.15.3  Not all movants have the right to an evidentiary hearing.4  Those 
movants who do proceed to evidentiary hearings have the burden of proving 
by a preponderance of the evidence that trial counsel failed to exercise the skill 
 
*B.A., Knox College, 2009; M.A., Truman State University, 2012; J.D. Candidate, Uni-
versity of Missouri School of Law, 2018; Managing Editor, Missouri Law Review, 
2017–2018.  I would like to express my thanks to Professor Chelseá R. Mitchell for 
lending her expertise, Dean S. David Mitchell for keeping an open office door during 
last minute revisions, Victoria Kassabaum for supporting our family during law school, 
and the members of the Missouri Law Review for their careful editing.  All mistakes 
are my own. 
 1. Barton v. State, 486 S.W.3d 332, 336 (Mo. 2016) (en banc).  Rule 24.035 pro-
vides the framework for a post-conviction relief claim following a guilty plea.  MO. 
SUP. CT. R. 24.035. 
 2. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); DePriest v. State, 510 
S.W.3d 331, 338 (Mo. 2017) (en banc).  Strickland was a case involving a guilty plea 
to multiple charges, including three counts of capital murder.  Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
672.  Justice O’Connor, writing for the majority, held that the standard for attorney 
performance is that of reasonably effective assistance, that a defendant must also be 
prejudiced even assuming the attorney acted unreasonably, and that the attorney in this 
case did not act unreasonably in his strategy during the sentencing hearing.  Id.  at 687, 
699, 700. 
 3. MO. SUP. CT. R. 29.15(b). 
 4. MO. SUP. CT. R. 29.15(h) (“If the court shall determine the motion and the files 
and records of the case conclusively show that the movant is entitled to no relief, a 
hearing shall not be held.  In such case, the court shall issue findings of fact and con-
clusions of law as provided in [Mo. Sup. Ct. R.] 29.15(j).”). 
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and diligence that reasonably competent counsel would use in a similar situa-
tion and that the movant was prejudiced in that there was a reasonable proba-
bility that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceeding would have been 
different.5 
The movant must overcome the strong presumption, however, that trial 
counsel’s conduct fell within the wide range of reasonable trial strategy;6 the 
movant must show otherwise, and as the United States Supreme Court said in 
Strickland, the notion of trial strategy can encompass countless scenarios.7 
In light of this statement, defense attorneys have the leeway to tailor their 
trial strategies to unique situations.  By contrast, this Note argues that defense 
attorneys might benefit if Missouri courts choose to chip away at the nebulous 
catchall of trial strategy and delineate some clear boundaries as to what is and 
what is not sound trial strategy in the most egregious cases.  Doing so would 
better equip trial counsel with the knowledge of how to try a case effectively 
and ease the burden of movants in post-conviction relief cases.  As a result, the 
overall quality of justice in Missouri courts would improve. 
Accordingly, the Missouri Court of Appeals, Southern District, recently 
announced an issue of first impression in Christian v. State.8  Trial counsel 
failed to object when the prosecutor read a portion of a deposition transcript to 
the jury from a related civil proceeding in which Vernon George Christian, the 
defendant in the criminal case, asserted his Fifth Amendment right to avoid 
self-incrimination.9  The Southern District said that, in this instance, failure by 
trial counsel to object was ineffective assistance of counsel and Christian was 
prejudiced as a result.10  This Note argues that this result represents a positive 
development in Strickland jurisprudence in Missouri. 
II.  FACTS AND HOLDING 
In November of 2007, James King realized that he had not received a 
property tax bill for a piece of property he purchased in 2004 in Taney County 
that consisted of some land and a cabin.11  When he called the Taney County 
Collector’s Office, he was told that he no longer owned the property.12  A deed 
purportedly signed by him had transferred the property to Christian and Mike 
 
 5. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 668, 687, 694 (1984); MO. SUP. CT. R. 29.15(i). 
 6. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
 7. Id. (“There are countless ways to provide effective assistance in any given 
case.”) 
 8. Christian v. State, 502 S.W.3d 702, 709 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Id. at 714. 
 11. Id. at 706. 
 12. Id. 
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Olson on November 22, 2006.13  The deed had been notarized by Edmund E. 
Barker and registered at the Taney County Collector’s Office.14 
King filed a civil suit against Christian, and after a bench trial the deed 
was transferred back to King.15  In a subsequent criminal case, Christian was 
tried by a jury on November 22 and 23, 2010, in the Circuit Court of Taney 
County.16  The jury returned a guilty verdict on one count of forgery, and Chris-
tian was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment.17 
At the criminal trial, King testified that he had never seen the deed Chris-
tian signed before it was shown to him at the collector’s office.18  King said 
that he had never met Christian and that no one had paid him money for the 
property, removed him of his mortgage obligation, or paid property taxes on 
the property since he acquired it in 2004.19  Handwriting expert Don Lock tes-
tified that King’s signature on the deed appeared not to be genuine and that, 
after comparing a signature Christian wrote in the Taney County Sheriff’s Of-
fice, the evidence pointed to Christian as the author.20 
During the State’s case in chief, the prosecutor read a portion of Chris-
tian’s deposition from the earlier civil suit.21  The deposition included refer-
ences to Christian’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to refuse to an-
swer questions that would implicate him in the pending criminal case.22  The 
prosecutor read the following lengthy exchange from the civil deposition into 
evidence at the criminal trial: 
Q. Okay. How much did you pay for [the property]?  Are you going 
to assert your Fifth Amendment right, sir? 
A. Yes. 
. . . . 
Q. Okay. And how much – did you tell me how much you paid for 
it? 
A. No, I didn’t. 
Q. Do you remember or know? 
 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. State v. Christian, 364 S.W.3d 797, 798 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012). 
 17. Id. at 800. 
 18. Christian, 502 S.W.3d at 706. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. at 706–07. 
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A. I wasn’t going to tell you. 
Q. Okay.  How much did you pay for it? 
A. I’m going to stand on the Fifth Amendment.  That’s my busi-
ness.  
. . . . 
Q. Okay. Now, then, when – what were the circumstances that Mr. 
King would bring you this deed? 
A. I’ll stand on that. 
Q. On your Fifth Amendment rights? 
A. Yeah. 
Q. So you’re refusing to answer any questions about the circum-
stances of this deed being brought to you based on your Fifth 
Amendment rights? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Okay.  If I were to ask you any questions concerning the petition 
that was filed, would you also assert your Fifth Amendment rights 
and not answer those questions? 
A. Probably so. 
Q. Well, I mean visit with your attorney. 
A. Ask, and I’ll tell you yes or no. 
Q. If I were to ask you any questions concerning the petition that 
was filed, the deed, the transaction where you claim Mr. King sold 
or conveyed this property to you, would you assert your Fifth 
Amendment rights? 
A. Yes. 
. . . . 
Q. Let me ask this question.  When Mr. King brought this deed to 
you, did any money change hands? You may want to visit with your 
attorney. 
A. I’ll stand on the Fifth on that. 
4
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. . . . 
Q. And when Mr. King brought you Exhibit 1 in 2006, did you pay 
him any money? 
A. I’m going to stand on the Fifth on that. 
. . . . 
Q. Okay.  Okay.  I’m about done, sir.  I just want to reiterate that if 
I were to ask you about the allegations of the petition or the trans-
actions that you – whereby you claim ownership of the property or 
claim Mr. King gave you the deed that’s Exhibit 1, you would as-
sert your Fifth Amendment rights and not answer those questions; 
is that correct? 
A. Yes, sir.23 
Christian’s trial counsel did not make a contemporaneous objection during this 
reading.24 
The next day, trial counsel motioned for a mistrial on the grounds that the 
exchange from the civil deposition was read into evidence in violation of Chris-
tian’s Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.25  Trial counsel 
motioned for a mistrial outside the hearing of the jury so as not to reinforce the 
jury’s remembrance and highlight the testimony.26  While arguing the motion 
for a mistrial, trial counsel said that he did not believe the prosecutor was going 
to read Christian’s Fifth Amendment invocations into evidence.27  Trial coun-
sel said, “I may have been wrong in that, Judge, and frankly I may have been 
ineffective in that.”28  In arguing against the mistrial, the prosecutor said that 
the Fifth Amendment invocations would not be referenced again.29  The court 
denied the request for a mistrial, saying that Christian’s Fifth Amendment in-
vocations did not have anything to do with Christian’s guilt or innocence in the 
criminal case.30  The trial court did not instruct the jury regarding the invoca-
tions.31 
 
 23. Id. at 707 (alteration in original). 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 707–08. 
 27. Id. at 707. 
 28. Id. at 708. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
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Christian testified in his own defense.32  He said that he bought the prop-
erty at a tax sale in 1987 and that King had lived on the property.33  When 
Christian heard King claim that he owned the property, Christian threatened to 
file suit.34  According to Christian, King then brought Christian the signed and 
notarized deed, but the recorder of deeds refused to record it because it had 
been notarized in the wrong place.35  Christian admitted that he had a friend 
named Edmund E. Barker36 re-notarize the deed, which was then recorded.37  
Christian explicitly denied that he had forged King’s signature on the deed.38  
After Christian was convicted, he made a direct appeal to the Southern District, 
which affirmed the conviction.39 
Christian was granted an evidentiary hearing after making a Rule 29.15 
motion, and the same judge presided over it as had presided over the criminal 
trial.40  Christian argued that because prosecutors are prohibited from using a 
defendant’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment as proof of guilt, any reasona-
bly competent trial counsel would have objected at the prosecution’s use of 
Christian’s invocations during the civil deposition.41  In contrast, the state ar-
gued that because it is not clear whether in Missouri such evidence is actually 
inadmissible, the reviewing court cannot merely accept the conclusion that rea-
sonably competent trial counsel would have objected.42 
At the evidentiary hearing trial counsel testified that he was aware the 
State intended to offer Christian’s statements from the deposition into evidence 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. The sole issue on the direct appeal was whether the trial court abused its dis-
cretion in finding that Barker was unavailable to testify at the trial.  State v. Christian, 
364 S.W.3d 797, 800 (Mo. Ct. App. 2012).  Barker was ninety years old at the time of 
the trial and unable to testify in court because of his infirm condition.  Id. at 799.  His 
deposition had to be taken at his home.  Id.  Barker testified that he lost his notary 
license as a result of re-notarizing the deed.  Id. at 800.  The reviewing court held that 
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Barker’s deposition testimony to 
be read into evidence after the state moved to preserve the testimony and proved that 
Barker was indeed unavailable.  Id. at 801–02. 
 37. See Christian, 502 S.W.3d at 708. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Christian, 364 S.W.3d at 802.  Christian argued that the state failed to prove 
that Barker was unavailable as a witness and did not make a good faith effort to obtain 
Barker’s presence at trial.  Id. at 801.  The state read into evidence a deposition of 
Barker, who was eighty-nine years old at the time, taken at Barker’s home.  Id. at 801–
02.  The Southern District affirmed the conviction, finding that the trial court’s ruling 
on this evidentiary issue was not against the logic of the circumstances as to be “so 
arbitrary and unreasonable as to shock the sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful 
consideration” on the part of the trial court.  Id. at 802. 
 40. Christian, 502 S.W.3d at 708 & n.10. 
 41. Id. at 709. 
 42. See id. at 710. 
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but that he had not anticipated the prosecutor would read Christian’s Fifth 
Amendment invocations.43  When asked why he did not make a contempora-
neous objection, trial counsel said, 
There are certain things that you simply believe that a prosecuting at-
torney acting in good faith would understand are so far out of bounds 
as to not use, and you get shocked and surprised at trial when they’re 
brought up.  And so I should have objected, but was quite surprised that 
they were being used.44 
Trial counsel said he did not know why he did not immediately motion for a 
mistrial but that when he “regained a little bit of composure,” he requested one 
the next day.45  Trial counsel did not expressly argue at the evidentiary hearing 
that this was a strategic choice.46 
The motion court denied Christian’s motion and found that Christian did 
not meet his burden for showing ineffective assistance of counsel.47  The mo-
tion court found that trial counsel made a clear record of his objection to the 
reference to Christian’s prior bad acts in his motion for the mistrial.48  Christian 
then filed an appeal in the Southern District.49 
The Southern District noted that no prior Missouri court case had squarely 
addressed the issue of whether an invocation of a criminal defendant’s assert-
ing his Fifth Amendment privilege during a civil proceeding would be admis-
sible as evidence.50  The court found that, in spite of the lack of precedent, the 
prosecutor’s reading into evidence of Christian’s civil deposition testimony 
was “clearly objectionable.”51  The Southern District then held that trial coun-
sel failed to exercise the skill and diligence of a reasonably competent attorney 
 
 43. Id. at 708–09. 
 44. Id. at 709. 
 45. Id. 
 46. See id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 712. 
 51. Id. (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (standing for the 
proposition that “the Fifth Amendment outlaws remnants of an inquisitorial system 
such as a comment on the refusal to testify” (internal quotation marks omitted)); State 
v. Hutchinson, 458 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Mo. 1970) (en banc) (standing for the proposition 
that “the defendant should not be punished in a criminal case for exercising the Fifth 
Amendment”); State v. Graves, 27 S.W.3d 806, 812 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (standing for 
the proposition that “the effect on the Fifth Amendment by affirmative proof of guilt 




Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
246 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
in failing to object when the prosecutor offered evidence of Christian’s invo-
cation of his Fifth Amendment privilege and that Christian was prejudiced as 
a result.52 
III.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A.  Strickland Standard 
To make a showing of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, a movant 
must demonstrate: (1) that trial counsel failed to exercise the skill and diligence 
that a reasonably competent counsel would have in a similar situation and (2) 
that he was prejudiced by that failure.53  Prejudice occurs when there is a rea-
sonable probability that, but for the unprofessional errors, the result would have 
been different.54  Prejudice is not, however, an outcome-determinative stand-
ard; it instead turns on the fairness of the underlying proceeding.55 
The findings of the motion court are presumed correct, and a reviewing 
court will only reverse if they are clearly erroneous, leaving the reviewing court 
with a definite and firm impression that a mistake has been made.56  To justify 
relief on a post-conviction motion, the movant must show that the “failure to 
object must have been of such character as to deprive the defendant substan-
tially of his right to a fair trial.”57  The movant must prove that a failure to 
object was not strategic; trial counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing 
to make a non-meritorious objection.58  The movant must overcome a strong 
presumption that a failure to object was sound trial strategy.59  Experienced 
trial counsel do not object in many instances to arguably improper questions 
for strategic purposes; they fear that frequent objections irritate the jury and 
highlight the statements complained of, exacerbating the effect of the improper 
questions.60  According to Strickland, “There are countless ways to provide 
effective assistance in any given case.”61  Not objecting to a clear implication 
of a defendant’s constitutional right, however, might be considered one in-
stance in which there is no reasonable trial strategy.62 
 
 52. Id. at 710, 714. 
 53. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 
418, 425 (Mo. 2002) (en banc). 
 54. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Deck, 68 S.W.3d at 429. 
 55. Deck, 68 S.W.3d at 427. 
 56. Worthington v. State, 166 S.W.3d 566, 572 (Mo. 2005) (en banc). 
 57. Ervin v. State, 80 S.W.3d 817, 822 (Mo. 2002) (en banc) (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (quoting State v. Bearden, 926 S.W.2d 483, 486 (Mo. Ct. App. 1996)). 
 58. State v. Clay, 975 S.W.2d 121, 135 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). 
 59. Hays v. State, 484 S.W.3d 121, 128 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015). 
 60. Id. at 128–29 (quoting Helmig v. State, 42 S.W.3d 658, 679 (Mo. Ct. App. 
2001)). 
 61. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). 
 62. See Christian v. State, 502 S.W.3d 702, 710, 713–14 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016); 
supra Part V.C. 
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B.  Underlying Evidentiary Issue 
As an evidentiary matter, the privilege against self-incrimination is “the 
essential mainstay of our adversary system.”63  The prosecution must not pe-
nalize a defendant for exercising his right to remain silent.64  In Missouri, stat-
utes65 and Supreme Court rules66 protect a criminal defendant’s constitutional 
guarantee of the rights to silence67 and due process.68  These rights apply any 
time the answer would tend to incriminate the defendant and could be used as 
evidence or to furnish a link in the chain of evidence.69  The privilege against 
self-incrimination applies whether or not a criminal charge is pending70 and is 
available to a witness in a civil deposition.71  When a criminal defendant makes 
a contemporaneous objection to a prosecutor’s direct reference to a defendant’s 
invocation of his right to silence, use of the direct reference “will almost invar-
iably require reversal of the conviction.”72  A reviewing court may order a re-
versal even if an indirect reference to a criminal defendant’s invocation of his 
privilege against self-incrimination is made “if there is a calculated intent to 
magnify that decision so as to call it to the jury’s attention.”73  However, a 
corrective instruction to the jury can often cure prejudice resulting from a direct 
reference to the defendant’s failure to testify.74 
Ordinarily, “[t]he mere failure to make objections does not constitute in-
effective assistance of counsel.”75  Missouri courts are cognizant that not mak-
ing an objection is often sound trial strategy: “In many instances seasoned trial 
counsel do not object to otherwise improper questions or arguments for strate-
gic purposes.  It is feared that frequent objections irritate the jury and highlight 
the statements complained of, resulting in more harm than good.”76  The failure 
to object must be significant enough “as to deprive the defendant substantially 
of his right to a fair trial.”77 
 
 63. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966). 
 64. State v. Hutchinson, 458 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Mo. 1970) (en banc). 
 65. MO. REV. STAT. § 546.270 (2016). 
 66. MO. SUP. CT. R. 27.05. 
 67. U.S. CONST. amend. V; MO. CONST. art. I, § 19. 
 68. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; MO. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 69. See State ex rel. Long v. Askren, 874 S.W.2d 466, 471–72 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1994). 
 70. State ex rel. Lieberman v. Goldman, 781 S.W.2d 802, 805 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1989). 
 71. State ex rel. Pulliam v. Swink, 514 S.W.2d 559, 560 (Mo. 1974) (en banc) (per 
curiam). 
 72. State v. Neff, 978 S.W.2d 341, 344 (Mo. 1998) (en banc). 
 73. Id. 
 74. State v. Garrison, 292 S.W.3d 555, 560 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009). 
 75. Ervin v. State, 80 S.W.3d 817, 822 (Mo. 2002) (en banc). 
 76. Barton v. State, 432 S.W.3d 741, 754 (Mo. 2014) (quoting State v. Tokar, 918 
S.W.2d 753, 768 (Mo. 1996) (en banc)). 
 77. Ervin, 80 S.W.3d at 822. 
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C.  Comparative Analysis 
In other jurisdictions, failure to object to testimony that references a crim-
inal defendant’s privilege against self-incrimination has been found to fall be-
low the standards of reasonably competent trial counsel.  Gregory G. Sarno, 
author of the American Law Report chapter “Adequacy of defense counsel’s 
representation of criminal client regarding confessions and related matters,” 
has analyzed the issue.78  He writes that generally “[w]hether defense counsel’s 
failure at trial to pose an objection, to introduction of his client’s statement, 
whose merits would or arguably would have been upheld amounts to incompe-
tent representation has depended . . . on the adequacy of the explanation for 
counsel’s inaction.”79  Sarno elucidates this principle by example, contrasting 
the decision in Commonwealth v. Roberts, a pre-Strickland, 1978 Pennsylvania 
case, from that in Boyer v. Patton, a Sixth Circuit case from the same year.80  
Sarno’s parsing of these two decisions helps illustrate the fine line the Christian 
court negotiated in its decision. 
In Roberts, trial counsel failed to object to the arresting officer’s testi-
mony concerning the defendant’s silence after the defendant’s arrest and re-
ceipt of Miranda81 warnings.82  The court said that an objection to the intro-
duction of this evidence “clearly” would not have been frivolous and that such 
evidence improperly infringed on the defendant’s Fifth Amendment privi-
lege.83  However, the court held that trial counsel was not ineffective because 
there was at least a reasonable basis for not making an objection, which was 
designed to effectuate the defendant’s innocence.84  The basis for not making 
an objection could have been that a curative instruction would have corrected 
the problem or that the reference to the Fifth Amendment privilege was isolated 
and not intended to invite an improper inference.85 
Sarno writes that, in Boyer, there was an inadequate explanation for trial 
counsel’s failure to object.86  In this case, a prison guard testified to the defend-
ant’s silence when the prison guard asked the defendant how he initially got 
outside the prison when the defendant was being carried back into the prison 
with a broken leg.87  At the post-conviction hearing, trial counsel said that he 
could not recall any specific reason for not objecting and that “it didn’t seem 
 
 78. Gregory G. Sarno, Annotation, Adequacy of Defense Counsel’s Representa-
tion of Criminal Client Regarding Confessions and Related Matters, 7 A.L.R.4th 180 
(1981). 
 79. Id. § 15. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
 82. Sarno, supra note 78, § 15 (citing Commonwealth v. Roberts, 397 A.2d 1187 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)). 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. (citing Boyer v. Patton, 579 F.2d 284 (3d Cir. 1978)). 
 87. Id. 
10
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important enough.”88  The reviewing court found that testimony to the defend-
ant’s silence at the time of arrest violated the Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination and that trial counsel should have realized this.89  
Therefore, even with conduct at trial that was closely analogous to that in the 
Roberts case, the reviewing court found that trial counsel committed an unpro-
fessional error and was prejudiced as a result.90 
IV.  INSTANT DECISION 
The Southern District said that Christian’s claim was a matter of first im-
pression in Missouri.91  Christian, the State, and the Southern District all agreed 
that no Missouri case had yet addressed whether an invocation of the Fifth 
Amendment made in a civil proceeding can be admitted into evidence in a sub-
sequent criminal trial.92 
A.  Majority Opinion 
Writing for the majority, Judge Burrell held that, as a matter of first im-
pression, trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object at the prosecutor’s 
offering of the evidence of Christian’s invocation of his Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege and that Christian was consequently prejudiced.93  The court found that 
[a]ctual evidence94 presented by the prosecutor that Movant had re-
fused to answer questions based upon the Fifth Amendment about the 
very document he is alleged to have forged is a much greater direction 
of the jury’s attention to the fact that Movant had exercised his right not 
to testify than what would have flowed from a prohibited reference 
made during voir dire.95 
The court found that trial counsel’s failure to make a contemporaneous objec-
tion to the prosecutor’s use of Christian’s Fifth Amendment invocations was 
clearly objectionable even though no Missouri opinion has expressly held that 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Christian v. State, 502 S.W.3d 702, 709 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016). 
 92. Id. at 709–10. 
 93. Id. at 710, 714. 
 94. The court here emphasizes actual evidence, in contrast to Judge Rahmeyer’s 
dissent, which argues that Missouri case law is clear that the evidence could have been 
admissible for impeachment purposes.  Id. at 715 (Rahmeyer, J., dissenting) (“Prearrest 
silence and even post-arrest, but pre-Miranda or other similar, affirmative governmen-
tal assurance, silence is admissible to impeach a criminal defendant’s trial testimony.” 
(citing  Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 605–07 (1982); State v. Chambers, 330 S.W.3d 
539, 542–44 (Mo. Ct. App. 2010))). 
 95. Id. at 713 (majority opinion). 
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the state is barred from using Fifth Amendment invocations from civil deposi-
tions in criminal prosecutions.96  Based on the longstanding principles that 
Fifth Amendment privileges against self-incrimination are essential to the ad-
versarial system, the court found that trial counsel’s failure to object could not 
be said to be reasonable trial strategy.97  Thus, the court found that the motion 
court clearly erred in finding that defense counsel acted with the skill and dili-
gence of a reasonably competent attorney and in finding that Christian was not 
prejudiced.98 
Next, the court found that Christian was prejudiced as a result of the un-
professional error.99  The court first noted that the standard for prejudice is not 
outcome-determinative.100  However, the “benchmark for judging whether 
counsel is ineffective . . . is whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the 
proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on 
as having produced a just result.”101  The court also stated that the fact that 
Christian ultimately testified at the criminal trial did not cure the effect of trial 
counsel’s failure to object.102  Because the invocations of Christian’s Fifth 
Amendment privilege were presented in the state’s case in chief as affirmative 
evidence of Christian’s guilt and no curative instruction was given to the jury 
at the time of the admission of the evidence or afterward, the court found that 
the evidence offered had a bearing on the jury’s verdict.103  Citing Wigmore on 
Evidence, the court found that the layman’s natural inclination in hearing that 
a criminal defendant has asserted a privilege is to believe in a “clear confession 
of crime.”104  The court vacated Christian’s conviction and sentence, reversed 
the motion court’s denial of post-conviction relief, and remanded the case for 
a new trial.105 
B.  Dissenting Opinion 
Judge Rahmeyer dissented.106  She argued that trial counsel did not nec-
essarily make an unprofessional error, writing, “The majority opinion evidently 
holds trial counsel to a much higher level of diligence than a reasonably com-
 
 96. Id. at 712. 
 97. Id. at 713. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 714. 
 100. Id. at 713 (citing Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 418, 426–28 (Mo. 2002) (en banc)). 
 101. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Dorsey v. State, 156 S.W.3d 825, 
835 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005)). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 713–14. 
 104. Id. at 714 (citing 8 J. WIGMORE, WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2272 (McNaughton 
rev. 1961)). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 715 (Rahmeyer, J., dissenting). 
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petent counsel.  Apparently, trial counsel should have anticipated [the prose-
cutor’s] decision.”107  Judge Rahmeyer argued that the majority opinion faulted 
trial counsel for requesting a mistrial rather than making a contemporaneous 
objection.108 
Further, Judge Rahmeyer pointed out that the outcome of the underlying 
evidentiary issue is not certain in Missouri.109  She argued that the use of Chris-
tian’s civil deposition testimony may have been admissible in a case, such as 
the instant case, in which the defendant chose to testify at the criminal trial; 
thus, the evidence could have been used for proper impeachment purposes.110  
At his criminal trial, Christian did indeed testify and did not invoke his right to 
remain silent.111 
Finally, Judge Rahmeyer asserted that Christian could not have been prej-
udiced.112  Arguing that Christian faced “overwhelming” evidence at the crim-
inal trial that Christian altered a writing two times, Judge Rahmeyer said that 
she was not left with “a definite and firm impression that a mistake [had] been 
made.”113 
V.  COMMENT 
The instant case presents several issues.  First, did the Southern District 
correctly rule as a matter of first impression on the underlying evidentiary is-
sue?  Second, how well does the Southern District’s holding follow Strickland?  
An answer to that question can be found by a comparative analysis of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel cases in other jurisdictions.  Finally, what are the 
implications of the Christian holding?  This Part argues that knowing that trial 
strategy is not always presumptively effective assistance of counsel is a desired 
outcome for everyone – criminal defendants, defense attorneys who uncom-
fortably find themselves as the main witness at evidentiary hearings, and the 
state generally.  Chipping away at the broad category of strategy and defining 
specific actions by a lawyer that are ineffective, such as when a prosecutor 
introduces into evidence a defendant’s previously-invoked Fifth Amendment 
privilege, are desired outcomes, bringing clarity to the criminal process and 
benefiting both lawyers and defendants. 
 
 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 715–16. 
 113. Id. at 716–17. 
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A.  Underlying Evidentiary Issue 
As a matter of first impression, the Christian court held that direct evi-
dence presented by the prosecutor of Christian’s invocation of his Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination found in the transcript of a 
civil deposition was not admissible.114  The court held that even though there 
was not precedent in Missouri barring such testimony from admissibility in 
evidence that did “not mean that the prosecutor’s doing so here was not clearly 
objectionable.”115  The court reached this ruling both by relying on Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence and by the fact that the prosecutor had been prohib-
ited earlier from referencing this material during voir dire.116 
In her dissent, Judge Rahmeyer argued that the evidence could have been 
admissible for impeachment purposes.117  She rejected the notion that it was 
clear from Missouri case law that this evidence would have been prohibited.118  
She bolstered her argument with the contention that Christian did actually tes-
tify at the criminal trial.119  Thus, there could have been a proper impeachment 
purpose for the use of the testimony that the majority ultimately found inad-
missible.120 
While both opinions claim some authority from Fifth Amendment juris-
prudence, the dissent’s argument ignores that the evidence could not have been 
admitted in the prosecutor’s case in chief if it were offered for impeachment 
purposes.  If the evidence were offered in the prosecutor’s rebuttal, the evi-
dence could have been properly admitted for impeachment.  It is well settled 
in Missouri that a criminal defendant who elects to take the stand in his own 
defense and is subject to cross-examination may be subject to impeachment.121  
A prosecutor cannot, however, introduce evidence of silence for impeachment 
purposes before the criminal defendant takes the stand in his own defense.122  
Regardless, the entire issue of timing is moot because the majority held that, 
 
 114. Id. at 712 (majority opinion). 
 115. Id. (citing Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (standing for the 
proposition that “the Fifth Amendment outlaws remnants of an inquisitorial system 
such as a comment on the refusal to testify” (internal quotation marks omitted)); State 
v. Hutchinson, 458 S.W.2d 553, 555 (Mo. 1970) (en banc) (standing for the proposition 
that “the defendant should not be punished in a criminal case for exercising the Fifth 
Amendment”); State v. Graves, 27 S.W.3d 806, 812 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (standing for 
the proposition that “the effect on the Fifth Amendment by affirmative proof of guilt 
via post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence is too severe to be permitted” (internal quotation 
marks omitted))). 
 116. Id. at 712–13. 
 117. Id. at 715 (Rahmeyer, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See id. 
 121. See, e.g., State v. Amos, 490 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Mo. Ct. App. 1972). 
 122. See State v. Duncan, 397 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Mo. Ct. App. 2013). 
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categorically, the evidence that referenced Christian’s Fifth Amendment invo-
cations was inadmissible.123  Whether the evidentiary issue will be litigated 
again remains to be seen. 
B.  Comparative Analysis 
Setting aside the underlying evidentiary issue, this Note next considers 
the failure to object to evidence that reveals that a defendant invoked the Fifth 
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 
According to Sarno’s reasoning that the court may consider the adequacy 
of counsel’s explanation for not making an objection,124 Christian’s trial coun-
sel might have sealed the fate of the case on a post-conviction appeal when he 
admitted he “may have been ineffective.”125  Such a statement might have en-
sured that counsel’s conduct would be interpreted later as ineffective and un-
dermined any claim for a reasonable basis of trial strategy.126 
The fact that the trial counsel did not seek a curative instruction at all may 
have similarly sealed his fate in a post-conviction claim, which Sarno’s analy-
sis of Roberts implies.127  Sarno also notes that whether a curative instruction 
would alleviate the damage done by counsel’s unprofessional error also enters 
the calculus of whether counsel was ineffective.128  It is interesting to speculate 
if the Southern District still would have found ineffective assistance of counsel 
had trial counsel also sought a curative instruction while arguing for a mistrial.  
But, those are not the facts of Christian. 
In their treatise Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, John M. Burkoff and 
Nancy M. Burkoff have catalogued many courts that have rejected arguments 
that defense counsel was ineffective on the grounds that counsel failed to object 
to the introduction of particular evidence or that such evidence was not preju-
dicial.129  Further, the authors assert, “Not all inaction on the part of defense 
 
 123. See Christian, 502 S.W.3d at 712. 
 124. See discussion supra notes 78–90. 
 125. Christian, 502 S.W.3d at 708. 
 126. This conclusion seems logical enough from a practical standpoint, but as a 
thought experiment, it is worth contemplating whether a criminal defense lawyer who 
admits at trial to providing ineffective assistance has established a sufficient condition 
for a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim.  This Note takes up the impli-
cations of this question shortly below. 
 127. Sarno, supra note 78, § 15 (citing Commonwealth v. Roberts, 397 A.2d 1187 
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)). 
 128. Id. 
 129. JOHN M. BURKOFF & NANCY M. BURKOFF, INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
COUNSEL, § 7:15 (2017 ed.) (reporting cases in the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh circuits and from state courts in 
Arkansas, California, Georgia, Indiana, Iowa, Nebraska, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Car-
olina, South Dakota, Wisconsin, Washington, and Wyoming). 
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counsel in the face of questionable prosecutorial actions results in ineffective 
assistance.”130 
However, as the holding of Christian makes clear, the matter of Fifth 
Amendment privilege is an altogether different animal.  Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege deserves heightened protection, and trial counsel must be on alert against 
prosecutorial infringement of this right.  Further, failure to object to the offer-
ing of evidence or argument of this type should not be considered sound trial 
strategy, ever. 
Often, the referencing of a criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment silence 
occurs at closing argument.131  As an example, Burkoff and Burkoff cite Combs 
v. Coyle,132 a Sixth Circuit case reviewing a conviction for aggravated murder, 
which held that trial counsel was ineffective when, during argument, the pros-
ecutor referenced that the defendant invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege 
against self-incrimination in a post-arrest statement.133  The authors write, 
“Counsel should have known that the use of his client’s pre-arrest silence was 
at least constitutionally suspect, and should have objected.  Since he failed to 
do so, his conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.”134  
While the instant case concerns the introduction of evidence and not improper 
argument, it, like Combs, gives proper consideration to the gravity of a defend-
ant’s Fifth Amendment privilege.135  Thus, Christian follows in the spirit of 
Strickland, giving criminal defendants full constitutional protection while put-
ting defense attorneys on notice that any use of a defendant’s asserted Fifth 
Amendment rights is suspect. 
Lastly, it is important to keep in mind that a defendant appealing under 
Strickland must also meet his burden to prove that he was prejudiced by trial 
counsel’s conduct.136  This is largely a fact-dependent inquiry: prejudice occurs 
when there is a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel’s unprofes-
sional error, the result would have been different.137  As Judge Rahmeyer cor-
rectly implied in her dissent, showing prejudice is a difficult – but, as evidenced 
by the majority opinion, not insurmountable – burden to meet when a defendant 
faces near overwhelming evidence.138 
 
 130. Id. § 7:44. 
 131. See id. § 7:43. 
 132. Combs v. Coyle, 205 F.3d 269 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 133. BURKOFF & BURKOFF, supra note 129, § 7:43; Combs, 205 F.3d at 279, 287. 
 134. BURKOFF & BURKOFF, supra note 129, § 7:43. 
 135. See Christian v. State, 502 S.W.3d 702, 711 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016). 
 136. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); Deck v. State, 68 S.W.3d 
418, 425 (Mo. 2002) (en banc). 
 137. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Deck, 68 S.W.3d at 429. 
 138. Christian, 502 S.W.3d at 716–17 (Rahmeyer, J., dissenting). 
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C.  Implications 
What follows from Christian v. State, and how should trial lawyers con-
duct themselves following this decision? 
The most serious implication of Christian v. State is that the case might 
be seen as an initial volley meant to chip away at the concept of reasonable trial 
strategy.139  Any attempts to move Strickland analysis from standards-based 
analysis to rules-based analysis at the margins are welcome, for it is obvious 
from the perspective of the convicted criminal on a post-conviction appeal that 
far too much of a lawyer’s conduct might fall into the description of reasonable 
trial strategy.140  However, criminal defense attorneys might benefit as well 
from having some concrete examples of what they may and may not do in a 
trial.  Such predictability would be helpful in Missouri law and would conse-
quently improve the overall quality of justice in the state.  Moreover, there are 
clear pedagogical implications for Christian v. State.  Trial practice classes at 
Missouri law schools should amend any discussions of when to and not to ob-
ject with a discussion of Christian; namely, there are times in egregious cir-
cumstances, as here, when a criminal defense attorney must object. 
If Missouri courts choose to expand on the holding of Christian, one 
could predict that courts in the future will hold that failure of trial counsel to 
object to a prosecutor’s infringement on a criminal defendant’s constitutional 
rights in other contexts might also be considered deficient performance.141  In 
practice, criminal defense attorneys should guard themselves against exposure 
to these concerns – and exposure to potential disciplinary action – in the near 
future regardless of whether Missouri courts continue to hand down decisions 
such as Christian. 
Second, trial lawyers must be on the lookout for any attempt by a prose-
cutor to introduce a defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege into evidence.  Fol-
lowing the holding on the underlying evidentiary issue in Christian, an objec-
tion to the offering of this type of evidence will likely be meritorious.  Because 
a prosecutor’s referencing a criminal defendant’s Fifth Amendment privilege 
 
 139. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“There are countless ways to provide effective 
assistance in any given case.”). 
 140. In dissent, Justice Marshall was the first to levy this criticism upon the Strick-
land majority.  Id. at 707–08 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“My objection to the perfor-
mance standard adopted by the Court is that it is so malleable that, in practice, it will . 
. . have no grip at all . . . . To tell lawyers . . . that counsel for a criminal defendant must 
behave ‘reasonably’ . . . is to tell them almost nothing.”).  Justice Marshall argued that 
“more specific standards” – rules, even – for performance might be appropriate in areas 
that are “amenable to judicial oversight,” including defense counsel’s “making timely 
objections to significant, arguably erroneous rulings of the trial judge.”  Id. at 708–09.  
A rule requiring defense counsel to object to constitutional violations is unquestionably 
“amenable to judicial oversight.” 
 141. But again, note the difference between deficient performance and prejudice, 
the two prongs of Strickland. 
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invoked during a civil proceeding will no longer be allowed in as direct evi-
dence in Missouri, criminal defendants will benefit from Christian’s holding.  
Prosecutors, in turn, must be ready to alter their presentation of evidence at trial 
to avoid the necessity of introducing such evidence. 
It is probably not a stretch to say that this implication of Christian is not 
a serious departure from practice in Missouri already.  The case could be seen 
as an outlier in an otherwise relatively fair system of criminal prosecutions; 
indeed, it involves a particularly troubling set of facts on the part of trial coun-
sel.  Regardless of whether this type of conduct is an outlier or not, all criminal 
defense attorneys practicing in Missouri need to be aware of Christian’s impli-
cations. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Criminal defense lawyers should be aware of the outcome of Christian v. 
State, for the case takes a significant, affirmative step in regulating the conduct 
of lawyers.  Although Judge Rahmeyer’s insight that the underlying eviden-
tiary issue – whether the prosecutor’s reading of Christian’s invocations of the 
Fifth Amendment privilege would have been ruled inadmissible if chal-
lenged142 – could have been decided either way in Missouri is sound, the hold-
ing of Christian v. State will stand for now.  Additionally, attorneys who work 
on post-conviction relief cases may now be more inclined to pursue arguments 
that trial counsel did not object.143  Ordinarily the concept of reasonable trial 
strategy enervates the post-conviction argument that trial counsel failed to ob-
ject either during the presentation of evidence or during argument.144  How-
ever, the instant case signals that that category is evidently overbroad, even if 
it grants defense attorneys broad license to tailor their trial strategies to unique 
cases.  This Note welcomes Missouri courts to continue to chip away at the 
category of “trial strategy” in the most egregious cases. 
No doubt the underlying evidentiary issue will be litigated again.  The 
uncertainty regarding the evidentiary issue does not serve trial lawyers well; 
however, this Note takes the position that the prosecutor’s use of the defend-
ant’s Fifth Amendment invocations was in contravention to Christian’s rights.  
Regardless, the instant case will serve as precedent that a prosecutor’s use of a 
criminal defendant’s invocation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination during a previous civil deposition is probably not admissible, 
even when the defendant later takes the stand in the criminal trial. 
 
 142. Christian, 502 S.W.3d at 715 (Rahmeyer, J., dissenting). 
 143. Ordinarily, trial counsel will not be deemed ineffective for failing to make a 
nonmeritorious objection.  State v. Clay, 975 S.W.2d 121, 135 (Mo. 1998) (en banc).  
However, there are instances in cases, as here, in which trial counsel cannot be said to 
have exercised a reasonable trial strategy and therefore must object. 
 144. See Clay, 975 S.W.2d at 135; see also Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (“[A] court 
must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range 
of reasonable professional assistance . . . .”). 
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For now, Christian v. State stands for the proposition that a trial lawyer 
who fails to object to the prosecutor’s introduction of a criminal defendant’s 
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination falls below the standards 
of reasonably competent trial counsel.145  If the criminal defendant has also 
been prejudiced, a remedy is available.146 As far as Christian v. State erodes 
the overbroad category of reasonable trial strategy, Missouri courts are moving 





































 145. Christian, 502 S.W.3d at 710, 713. 
 146. See id. at 714 (ordering the conviction and sentence to be vacated and remand-
ing for a new trial). 
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